出于意识形态，原著英文版对于中越之战用了“invasion ”一词，在翻译的时候，很多中译本用“进攻”等词代替，其实本人觉得没必要，翻译最重要的是忠于原著，对不同观点的地方可加以注解。
原英文版：
The Third Vietnam War
On February 17, China mounted a multipronged invasion of northern Vietnam from s outhern China’s Guangxi and Yunnan provinces. The size of the Chinese force
reflected the importance China attached to the operation; it has been estimated to have numbered more than 200,000 and perhaps as many as 400,000
PLA soldiers.47 One historian has concluded that the invasion force, which
included “regular ground forces, militia, and naval and air force units . .
. was similar in scale to the assault with which China made such an impact on its
entry into the Korean War in November 1950.” 48
The official Chinesepress accounts called it the “Self-Defensive Counterattack Against Vietnam” or the “Counterattack in Self-Defense on the Sino-Vietnamese Border.” It represented the Chinese version of deterrence, an invasion advertised in advance to forestall the next Vietnamese move.
The target of China’s military was a fellow Communist country, recent ally, and longtime beneficiary of Chinese economic and military support. The goal was to preserve the strategic equilibrium in Asia, as China saw it. Further, China undertook the campaign with the moral support, diplomatic backing, and intelligence
cooperation of the United States—the same “imperialist power” that Beijing had helped eject from Indochina five years earlier.
The stated
Chinese war aim was to “put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited lesson.”49
“Appropriate” meant to inflict sufficient damage to affect Vietnamese options and calculations for the future; “limited” implied that it would be ended before outside intervention or other factors drove it out of control. It was also a direct challenge to the Soviet Union.
Deng’s prediction that the Soviet Union would not attack China was borne out. The day after China launched its invasion, the Soviet government released a lukewarm statement that, while condemning China’s “criminal” attack, emphasized that “the heroic Vietnamese people . . .is capable of standing up for itself this time again[.]”50 The Soviet military response was limited to sending a naval task
force to the South China Sea, undertaking a limited arms airlift to Hanoi,
and stepping up air patrols along the Sino-Soviet border. The airlift was constrained by geography but also by internal
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hesitations. In the end, the Soviet Union gave as much support in 1979 to its new ally, Vietnam, as it had extended twenty years earlier to its then ally, China, in the Taiwan Strait Crises. In neither case would the Soviet Union run any risks of a wider war. Shortly after the war, Hua Guofeng summed up the outcome in a pithy phrase contemptuous of Soviet leaders: “As for threatening us, they did that by maneuvers near the border, sending ships to the South China Sea. But they did not dare to move. So after all we could still touch the buttocks of the tiger.”
Deng sarcastically rejected American advice to be careful. During a late February
1979 visit of Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal to Beijing,Blumenthal
called for Chinese troops to withdraw from Vietnam “as quickly as possible” because Beijing “ran risks that were unwarranted.” 51 Deng demurred.
Speaking to American reporters just before his meeting with Blumenthal, Deng
displayed his disdain for equivocation, mocking “some people” who were “afraid of offending” the “Cuba of the Orient.”52
As in the Sino-Indian War, China executed a limited “punitive” strike followed immediately by a retreat. It was over in twenty-nine days. Shortly after the PLA captured(and reportedly laid waste to) the capitals of the three Vietnamese provinces along the border, Beijing announced that Chinese forces would withdraw from Vietnam, save for several disputed pieces of territory. Beijing made no attempt to overthrow the Hanoi government or to enter Cambodia in any overt capacity.
A month after
the Chinese troops had withdrawn, Deng explained the Chinese strategy to me on
a visit to Beijing:
DENG: After I
came back [from the United
States], we immediately fought a war. But we
asked you for your opinion beforehand. I talked it over with President Carter
and then he replied in a very formal and solemn way. He read a written text to
me. I said to him: China will handle this question independently and if there is any risk, China will take on the risk alone. In retrospect, we think if we had driven deeper into Vietnam in our punitive action, it would have been even better.
KISSINGER: It could be.
DENG: Because our forces were sufficient to drive all the way to Hanoi. But it wouldn’t be advisable to go that far.
KISSINGER: No,it would probably have gone beyond the limits of calculation.
DENG: Yes, you’re right. But we could have driven 30 kilometers deeper into Vietnam.We occupied all the defensive areas of fortification. There wasn’t a defense line left all the way to Hanoi.
The conventional
wisdom among historians is that the war was a costly Chinese failure.53 The
effects of the PLA’s politicization during the Cultural Revolution became apparent during the campaign: hampered by outdated equipment, logistical problems, personnel shortages, and inflexible tactics,Chinese forces advanced slowly and at great cost. By some analysts’ estimates, the PLA suffered as many killed in action in one month of fighting the Third Vietnam War as the United States suffered in the most costly years of the second one.54
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A fewveterans of the Fordadministration understood this hint about the invitation to SecretarySchlesinger, aborted when Ford dismissed him.
The main agendawas to define the United States’ military relationship with China. The Carter administration hadcome to the conclusion that an
increase inChina’stechnological and military capacity was important for global equilibrium and Americannational security. Washington had “drawn a
distinctionbetween the Soviet Union and China,” Secretary Brown explained, and was willing to transfer somemilitary technology to China that it would
not makeavailable to the Soviets.58 Further, the United States was willing to sell “military equipment” to China (such as surveillanceequipment and
vehicles),though not “arms.” It would not, moreover, interferein decisions by NATO allies to sell arms to China. As President Carterexplained in his
instructions toBrzezinski:
[T]he UnitedStates does not object to the more forthcoming attitude which our allies areadopting in regard to trade with China in technologysensitive
areas. We havean interest in a strong and secure China—and we recognize and respect this interest.59
In the end, China was not able to rescue the Khmer Rouge orforce Hanoi to withdraw its troops from Cambodia foranother decade; perhaps
recognizingthis, Beijingframed its war aims in much more limited terms. However, Beijingdid impose heavy costs on Vietnam.Chinese diplomacy in
Southeast Asiabefore, during, and after the war worked with great determination and skill toisolate Hanoi. Chinamaintained a heavy military presence
along theborder, retained several disputed pieces of territory, and continued to holdout the threat of a “second lesson” to Hanoi. For years afterward,
Vietnam was forced to support considerable forces on its northern border todefend against another possible Chinese attack.60 As Deng had told
Mondale in August1979:
For a country ofthat size to keep a standing force of more than one million, where will youfind enough work force? A standing force of one million
needs a lot oflogistical support. Now they depend on the Soviet Union.Some estimates say they are getting $2 million a day from the SovietUnion,
some estimatessay $2½ million. . .. [I]t will increase difficulties, and this bu den on the SovietUnion will grow heavier and heavier. Things will
become moredifficult. In time the Vietnamese will come to realize that not all theirrequests to the Soviet Union can be met. Inthose circumstances
perhaps a newsituation will emerge.61
That situationdid, in fact, occur over a decade later when the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Soviet financial support broughtabout a retrenchment
in Vietnamesedeployment in Cambodia.Ultimately over a time period more difficult to sustain for democraticsocieties, Chinaachieved a considerable
part of itsstrategic objectives in Southeast Asia. Dengachieved sufficient maneuvering room to meet his objective of thwarting Sovietdomination of
Southeast Asiaand the Malacca Strait.
The Carteradministration performed a tightrope act that maintained an option toward the Soviet Union via negotiations over the limitations ofstrategic
arms whilebasing its Asian policy on the recognition that Moscow remained the principal strategicadversary.
The ultimateloser in the conflict was the Soviet Union,whose global ambitions had caused alarm around the world. A Soviet ally had beenattacked by
the Soviet Union’s most vocal and strategically mostexplicit adversary, which was openly agitating for a containment allianceagainst Moscow—all this
within a monthof the conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. In retrospect, Moscow’s relative passivity in the ThirdVietnam War can be seen as
the firstsymptom of the decline of the Soviet Union.One wonders whether the Soviets’ decision a year later to intervene in Afghanistan was prompted in
part by anattempt to compensate for their ineffectuality in supporting Vietnam against the Chinese attack.In either case, the Soviets’ miscalculation in
both situationswas in not realizing the extent to which the correlation of global forces hadshifted against them. The Third Vietnam War may thus be
counted asanother example in which Chinese statesmen succeeded in achieving long-term,big-picture strategic objectives without the benefit of a
militaryestablishment comparable to that of their adversaries. Though providingbreathing space for the remnants of the Khmer Rouge can hardly be
counted as amoral victory, China achieved its larger geopolitical aims vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam—both of whose militaries werebetter
trained andequipped than China’s.I

Equanimity inthe face of materially superior forces has been deeply ingrained in Chinesestrategic thinking—as is apparent from the parallels with
China’s decision to intervene in theKorean War. Both Chinese decisions were directed against what Beijing perceivedto be a gathering danger—a
hostile power’s consolidation of bases atmultiple points along the Chinese periphery. In both cases, Beijing believed that if the hostile powerwere
allowed tocomplete its design, Chinawould be encircled and thus remain in a permanent state of vulnerability. Theadversary would be in a position to
launch a war ata time of its choosing, and knowledge of this advantage would allow it to act,as Hua Guofeng told President Carter when they met in
Tokyo, “without scruples.” 62 Therefore, a seemingly regionalissue—in the firstcase the American rebuff of North Korea, in the second case Vietnam’s
occupation ofCambodia—was treatedas “the focus ofthe struggles in the world” (as Zhou described Korea).63
Bothinterventions set Chinaagainst a stronger power that threatened its perception of its security; each,however, did so on terrain and at a time of
Beijing’s choosing. As Vice Premier GengBiao later told Brzezinski: “The Soviet Union’s support for Vietnam is a component of its global strategy. It is
directed notjust at Thailand, but at Malaysia, Singapore,Indonesia,and the Straits of Malacca. If they succeeded, it would be a fatal blow toASEAN and
would alsointerdict the lines of communications for Japanand the United States.We are committed to do something about this. We may have no
capability tocope with the Soviet Union, but we have the capability to cope with Vietnam.”64
These were notelegant affairs: Chinathrew troops into immensely costly battles and sustained casualties on a scalethat would have been
unacceptable inthe Western world. In the Sino-Vietnam War, the PLA seems to have pursued itstask with many shortcomings, significantly increasing
the scale ofChinese losses. But both interventions achieved noteworthy strategic goals. Attwo key moments in the Cold War, Beijingapplied its doctrine
of offensivedeterrence successfully. In Vietnam,China succeeded in exposingthe limits of the Soviet defense commitment to Hanoi and, more important,
of its overallstrategic reach. China waswilling to risk war with the Soviet Union toprove that it refused to be intimidated by the Soviet presence on its
southern flank.
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew hassummed up the ultimate result of the war: “The Western press wrote off the Chinese punitive action as a
failure. Ibelieve it changed the history of East Asia.”I